



# Telecoms Security Procedural Guidance

## General statement of policy under Article 24Y of the Telecommunications (Jersey) Law 2002

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# Contents

1	Overview: Procedural Guidance	1
2	Introduction	3
3	Compliance monitoring	10
4	Reporting security compromises	25
5	Enforcement	39
6	Information sharing	43

# 1 Overview: Procedural Guidance

- 1.1 Islanders and local organisations depend on reliable communication networks and services to help organise, operate and manage their daily lives, activities and businesses. More than ever, being able to connect with people, other organisations, applications and relevant information is considered highly important – and even critical – to everyday modern life.
- 1.2 At the same time, telecoms systems are becoming more complex in their design and operation, which may lead to an increased likelihood of communication network or service failure. The world is also becoming increasingly fragmented, unpredictable and even threatening, with telecommunications presenting a potential target for malicious actors seeking to disrupt, exploit or harm individuals, organisations and even national economies.
- 1.3 Jersey is not immune from such challenges, which are likely to continue growing and evolving. Recognising this, the Government of Jersey (the **Government**) has developed a comprehensive telecoms security framework designed to increase the security and reliability of the Island’s communications networks and services. The approach and structure of this framework aligns closely with that operating in the UK and includes a range of legally defined security measures and guidance on how to achieve compliance.
- 1.4 The local telecoms security framework gives the Jersey Competition Regulatory Authority (the **JCRA**) legal powers and duties to oversee the telecoms security framework’s operation and to work with telecoms providers to ensure its effectiveness. Given the Government’s decision to align its telecoms security framework closely with that of the UK, the Authority has chosen an approach to its telecoms security functions that aligns closely with that of UK communications regulator Ofcom while taking account of the local context wherever desirable or practical.
- 1.5 Under the telecoms law, the JCRA has a duty to publish a statement of its general policy explaining how it will carry out its telecoms security functions under the relevant articles of the amended law.
- 1.6 This document contains that statement of policy, or procedural guidance, issued by the JCRA under the amended law. Its purpose is to provide relevant information to public telecoms providers on the JCRA’s approach to its telecoms security functions under the amended law, and explains the associated procedures that telecoms providers should be aware of and follow, including:
  - Compliance monitoring;

- Reporting the risk and occurrence of security compromises;
- Enforcement; and
- Information sharing with other public bodies.

1.7 The JCRA will take the guidance contained in this document and related documents<sup>1</sup> into account when carrying out its telecoms security functions, which include:

- Seeking to ensure public telecoms providers comply with their security duties under the amended law which includes carrying out, or commissioning others to carry out, an assessment;
- Issuing assessment notices requiring a telecoms provider to comply with a duty;
- Directing telecoms providers to explain failure to act in accordance with guidance given by the Minister in a code of practice; and
- Enforcing compliance with the security duties, which may include imposing penalties or directing telecoms providers to take interim steps.

1.8 This Procedural Guidance sits alongside and complements two other closely related telecoms security framework guidance documents:

- (1) Telecoms Security Code of Practice: deals primarily with the measures providers should adopt to protect networks and services from cyber-attacks.
- (2) Telecoms Security Resilience Guidance: contains guidance for public telecoms providers that are legally required to design and operate inherently reliable communication networks and services.

1.9 The JCRA will keep its telecoms security functions under review and may amend and reissue this guidance from time-to-time. Under the amended law and in keeping with its general approach, the JCRA will consult on any proposed changes and take reasonable steps to ensure affected telecoms providers are aware of them.

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<sup>1</sup> Including the Resilience Guidance

## 2 Introduction

### Jersey's telecoms security framework

2.1 The Telecommunications Law (Jersey) Amending Regulations 2024 (the **Amending Regulations**) amended the Telecommunications (Jersey) Law 2002 (the **Law**) with the aim of increasing the security of Jersey's vital telecoms sector through creating a new telecoms security framework. All providers of public telecoms networks and services (**Providers**) must comply with the legal requirements of this telecoms security framework and certain Providers must further demonstrate their compliance with a range of security measures designed to ensure the effective functioning of Jersey's telecoms critical national infrastructure (CNI). This document is a statement of policy, or procedural guidance (the **Procedural Guidance**), issued under Article 24Y of the Law to explain the JCRA's general policy on its telecoms security functions related to the telecoms security framework. The section contains the following content:

- About public telecoms providers
- The new legislative framework
- The JCRA's role in the telecoms security framework
- About this Procedural Guidance

### About public telecoms providers

#### PECNs and PECSs

2.2 Before amending, the Law only applied to providers running a telecommunications system. The Amending Regulations created a new telecoms security framework which introduced a range of telecoms security duties that apply to both providers of public electronic communications networks (**PECNs**) and public electronic communications services (**PECSs**).

2.3 These are defined by Article 24A of the Law as being:

“public electronic communications network” (PECN) means an electronic communications network provided wholly or mainly for the purpose of making electronic communications services available to members of the public.

“public electronic communications service” (PECS) means an electronic communications service that is provided so as to be available for use by members of the public.

Providers of both PECNs and PECSs should be aware of their duties under the Law as amended by the Amending Regulations.

### **Publicly available service**

- 2.4 For clarity, the JCRA considers that "Public Electronic Communications Service" means any electronic communications service that is generally available for use by any and all members of the public who are both willing to pay for it and to accept the associated terms and conditions. A publicly available service is distinguishable from a bespoke service restricted to a limited group of individual and identifiable customers, and generally tailored to their unique operational, technical or strategic needs.
- 2.5 Furthermore, the term members of the public is not limited to residential or small business customers but also corporate or commercial customers including wholesale network connectivity or services provided to other Providers or businesses.

### **The new legislative framework**

- 2.6 The Amending Regulations introduce the following elements, which are discussed in more detail within this Procedural Guidance:
- (a) The overarching security duties set out in Articles 24K and 24M of the Law;
  - (b) Duties to take specified measures imposed by the Minister by order under Articles 24L and 24N of the Law;
  - (c) Guidance given by the Minister in codes of practice under Article 24O of the Law;
  - (d) Duties to report the risk of security compromise to the JCRA and to inform users under Article 24S of the Law; and
  - (e) Duties to report occurrence of security compromises to the JCRA under Article 24T of the Law.

### **The overarching duties set out in the Law**

- 2.7 The Amending Regulations modify the Law to add new security duties for all Providers of public telecoms networks and services in Jersey. Article 24K(1) of the Law sets out the following overarching duty:

The provider of a public electronic communications network or a public electronic communications service must take measures that are appropriate and proportionate for the purposes of –

- (a) Identifying the risks of security compromises occurring;

- (b) Reducing the risks of security compromises occurring; and
- (c) Preparing for the occurrence of security compromises.

2.8 The term “security compromise”, in relation to a PECN or a PECS, is defined in Article 24K(2) of the Law as:

- (a) Anything that compromises the availability, performance or functionality of the network or service;
- (b) Any unauthorised access to, interference with, or exploitation of the network or service, or anything that enables such access, interference or exploitation;
- (c) Anything that compromises the confidentiality of signals conveyed by means of the network or service;
- (d) Anything that causes signals conveyed by means of the network or service to be –
  - i. Lost;
  - ii. Unintentionally altered; or
  - iii. Altered otherwise than by or with the permission of the provider of the network or service;
- (e) Anything that occurs in connection with the network or service and compromises the confidentiality of data stored by electronic means;
- (f) Anything that occurs in connection with the network or service and causes data stored by electronic means to be –
  - i. Lost;
  - ii. Unintentionally altered; or
  - iii. Altered otherwise than by or with the permission of the person holding the data.
- (g) Anything that occurs in connection with the network or service and causes a connected security compromise.

2.9 Article 24M of the Law sets out further overarching duties requiring:

- (a) The provider of the network or service must take any measures that are appropriate and proportionate for the purpose of preventing adverse effects, on the network or service or otherwise, arising from the security compromise; and

(b) If the security compromise has an adverse effect on the network or service, the provider of the network or service must take any measures that are appropriate and proportionate for the purpose of remedying or mitigating that adverse effect.

### Duties to report risk and occurrence of security compromises to the JCRA

2.10 Additional to the duties mentioned above, Article 24S of the Law requires all Providers to report certain risks of security compromise to the JCRA and Article 24T places a requirement to report certain occurrences of security compromise to the JCRA.

### Duties to take specified measures imposed by the Minister by Order

2.11 Under Articles 24L and 24N of the Law, the Minister for Sustainable Economic Development (the **Minister**) has powers to provide by Order that a Provider must take specified measures to meet their security duties under Articles 24K and 24M. Under these powers, the Minister issued the Telecommunications (Security Measures) (Jersey) Order(2026) (the **Security Measures Order**), which came into force on 1 June 2026.<sup>2</sup>

2.12 Providers not ~~within scope of~~named in the Security Measures Order can choose to apply its specific measures and adopt any aspects of the guidance that they consider would be appropriate to secure their networks and services.<sup>3</sup>

### Guidance given by the Minister in codes of practice

2.13 Article 24O of the Law also gives the Minister powers to issue codes of practice providing guidance to Providers on compliance with the security measures established by the Security Measures Order. Under these powers, the Minister issued a Code of Practice (the **Code of Practice**) on 1 June 2026, setting out guidance for those Providers ~~within scope of the Minister has named in~~the Security Measures Order as needing to demonstrate compliance with the Code of Practice.

2.14 Article 24R of the Law imposes a duty on Providers to explain to the JCRA any failure to comply with the Code of Practice and gives the JCRA powers to require a statement from a Provider in relation to its compliance.

## The JCRA's role in the telecoms security framework

### Introduction

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<sup>2</sup> ~~Telecommunications (Security Measures) (Jersey) Order 2026—see here. The Government is consulting on draft versions of its Security Measures Order and Code of Practice in Q3 2025, with an expectation to issue final versions in Q1 2026.~~

<sup>3</sup> In its ~~Draft~~ Code of Practice, the Government states that ~~those specified in the Order will~~it applies to be Providers whose security is most crucial to the effective functioning of Jersey's telecoms CNI.

2.15 Under the Law, the JCRA has a range of telecoms security functions including several requiring positive approaches and activities, which are introduced in the remainder of this section and explained more fully further on in this Procedural Guidance. These include:

- Monitoring and enforcing compliance;
- Reporting to the Minister; and
- Working with others to enhance the telecoms security framework.

### **Monitoring and enforcing compliance**

2.16 Article 24V(1) of the Law places a general duty on the JCRA to seek to ensure that Providers comply with their security duties. This gives the JCRA a clear remit to work with Providers to improve their telecoms security and to monitor compliance with their telecoms security duties.

2.17 The Law gives the JCRA powers to monitor and enforce the compliance of Providers with their security duties as specified in Schedule 2 of the Law. In particular, the Law enables the JCRA to require Providers to share information considered necessary by the JCRA to carry out its telecoms security functions. This includes using its information gathering powers and to issue assessment notices which may include requiring Providers to:

- Complete system tests;
- Make staff available for interview; and
- Permit persons authorised by the JCRA to enter a Provider's premises to view information, equipment and observe tests.

Section 3 of the Procedural Guidance contains more information about this.

2.18 Where the JCRA has reasonable grounds to believe a Provider is contravening or has contravened a security duty, it may issue a notification of contravention setting out (among other things) the contravention and any remedial action to be taken by the Provider.

2.19 The JCRA also has a power to direct Providers to take interim steps to address security gaps during an enforcement process where certain conditions are satisfied, and the JCRA determines that it is reasonable to require interim steps pending the completion of enforcement action having regard to the seriousness or likely seriousness of the security compromise. In cases of non-compliance, including where a Provider has not complied with a notification of contravention, the JCRA can issue financial penalties. Section 5 of the Procedural Guidance contains more information about this.

### **Reporting to the Minister and others**

- 2.20 The JCRA's telecoms security functions also include certain reporting functions under the new security framework concerning security-related matters.
- 2.21 Under Article 24U of the Law, the JCRA must inform the Minister about certain risks and occurrences of security compromises and provides the power to inform the Minister about the risk or occurrence of other security compromises. The JCRA may inform any person or the public (either directly or via a Provider) about the risk or occurrence of security compromises and the technical measures that may be taken in response. Section 4 of the Procedural Guidance contains further information about this.
- 2.22 Under Article 24Z of the Law, the JCRA must provide reports to the Minister for the purpose of allowing the formulation of Jersey's future telecoms security policies. These reports are annual, except the first one, which covers the year in which Article 24Z came into force and the following one. Reports must include the following information for each reporting period:
- The level of compliance with security duties among Providers and the extent to which they have acted in accordance with the Code of Practice;
  - Any reports of risks or occurrences of security compromises received during the reporting period and actions taken by the JCRA in response;
  - A summary of the telecoms security functions carried out by the JCRA during the period, including entering premises, and any particular risks to Jersey's telecommunications networks and services the JCRA has become aware of; and
  - Other information of a kind specified in a direction given by the Minister.
- 2.23 The Minister, through the States of Jersey, is able to publish these reports or extracts from them.

### **Working with other public bodies**

- 2.24 Article 24ZG allows the JCRA to share information with others about the telecoms security framework in the interests of the security of Jersey or in connection with the prevention, detection or investigation of crime.
- 2.25 Those others include the Department for the Economy (the **DoE**), through the Minister, as the Government policy lead for the telecoms sector; the States of Jersey Police; the Jersey Cyber Security Centre (the **JCSC**), through the Minister, as lead for promoting and improving Jersey's cyber resilience; UK government departments, including the National Cyber Security Centre (the **NCSC**) as the UK's technical JCRA for cybersecurity, and other regulators. The JCRA will use legal information sharing gateways so that information can

be shared where necessary. Further detail on information sharing is set out in section 6 of the Procedural Guidance.

## The purpose of and approach to this document

2.26 This document provides general guidance about how the JCRA intends carrying out its telecoms security functions under the Law. Its purpose is to establish principles and set expectations for Providers with duties under the Law and who may be obliged to demonstrate compliance. The structural approach closely links the guidance provided with associated provisions under the Law. Wherever appropriate, this guidance document is structured to first highlight the Law's relevant sections and articles, followed by a summary of the JCRA's general policy and approach to allow a fuller understanding of the JCRA's chosen approach to its telecoms security functions and emphasise legal obligations placed on Providers.

## 3 Compliance monitoring

### Introduction

- 3.1 In this section the JCRA sets out its approach to monitoring compliance with security duties imposed on Providers under the Law. Its contents include:
- Introduction
  - Compliance monitoring principles
  - Requirement to demonstrate compliance
  - Approach to assessing compliance
  - Information-gathering powers
  - Testing
  - Failure to follow the Code of Practice
  - Assessments
  - Entering premises
- 3.2 Under Article 24V(1) of the Law, the JCRA has a general duty to seek to ensure that Providers comply with their security duties. The JCRA will achieve this through adopting a proactive supervisory approach when engaging and working with Providers. This section of the Procedural Guidance sets out the principles behind the JCRA's approach to this function, providing general guidance on the compliance monitoring process and steps that may be taken to enforce compliance with Providers' security duties. It also explains how the JCRA expects to use its statutory information gathering powers in connection with the telecoms security framework.

### Compliance monitoring principles

#### **Duty to seek to ensure compliance**

- 3.3 The Amending Regulations significantly enhance the Law to add substantial additions to regulate security in the Island's telecommunications sector. Within this telecoms security framework, Providers have a greatly expanded range of security duties and the JCRA has important new duties and associated powers including seeking to ensure compliance through proactive monitoring and, if necessary, enforcement with legal and regulatory requirements.
- 3.4 The JCRA expects Providers to ensure that they understand and comply with duties placed on them by the telecoms security framework. This means being fully aware of the Law,

associated Orders and relevant guidance given by the Minister in the Code of Practice and in regulatory guidance issued by the JCRA, including guidance on the resilience of local communications networks and services.<sup>4</sup>

- 3.5 Article 24V of the Law places a general duty on the JCRA to seek to ensure that Providers comply with security duties imposed on them by Articles 24K to 24N, 24S and 24T, which means taking a proactive approach to monitoring and ensuring compliance and carrying out positive enforcement activities if necessary.

### **The approach to monitoring Providers within the scope of the Security Measures Order Approach to monitoring providers**

~~3.6 While legal duties contained in the Law apply equally to all public telecoms providers, the Security Measures Order only applies to those with an annual relevant turnover of £1 million (or equivalent) or above. Consistent with the scope of the Security Measures Order, the rest of this section explains how the Authority intends identifying and notifying those Providers and the approach to monitoring their compliance with the Security Measures Order.~~


~~3.6 While legal duties contained in the Law apply equally to all public telecoms providers, the JCRA's compliance monitoring principles apply only to those Providers the Minister has specified in the Order. The rest of this section explains how the JCRA intends to approach this monitoring.~~

- 3.7 Due to the nature of the telecoms security framework, Providers' implementation of telecoms security measures will evolve and the JCRA expects to understand more about their networks, services and compliance approaches over time. For this reason, it sees compliance as an ongoing journey, which will ramp up in line with the phased implementation timeframes set out in the Code of Practice. An overview of the JCRA's planned is summarised in Figure 1 (below) and explained further in this section of the Procedural Guidance.

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<sup>4</sup> [JCRA: Telecoms Security Resilience Guidance, Guidance for telecoms providers on resilience-related security duties under the Telecommunications \(Jersey\) Law 2002 – see here for more information.](#)~~Reference the Resilience Guidance.~~

Figure 1: Compliance monitoring approach for Providers with scope of the Security Measures Order



3.8 — The JCRA understands that the Minister may revise the Order and the Code from time-to-time based on ongoing analysis of the threats and risks faced by Jersey and the need to maintain the security and resilience of the Island’s public telecoms networks and services. This may include adding or removing Providers from the list of those identified as having to demonstrate compliance with duties under the telecoms security framework.

### Establish requirements to demonstrate compliance with the Code of Practice

3.93.8 The Security Measures Order defines relevant turnover as turnover from any relevant activity carried out wholly or partly in Jersey after the deduction of sales tax (GST).

Relevant activity means:

- the provision of electronic communications services to third parties;
- the provision of electronic communications networks, electronic communications services and network access to communications providers; or
- the making available of associated facilities to communications providers.

3.103.9 Consistent with its established approach to assessing turnover for the purpose of calculating annual telecoms licence fees, the JCRA interprets relevant activity as meaning all a Provider’s commercial activities except:

- Non-telecoms related business

- Services carried out entirely outside the Bailiwick
- Data centre hosting and services
- Mobile handsets and accessories
- Consultancy
- Sales of CPE and customer wiring
- Managed services
- Call Centre Services
- Other deductions for non-qualifying services

[3.113.10](#) The JCRA already collects data on relevant turnover based on the relevant activity criteria shown above for another purpose. The JCRA will use data it already holds to establish and notify Providers in scope of the Security Measures Order, which it expects to do so in April/May 2026. Where a Provider already submits turnover statements to the Authority that demonstrate relevant turnover in excess of £1 million (or equivalent) it should presume that it will be in scope of the Security Measures Order, nonetheless the JCRA will notify them of the outcome of its assessment by the date given previously. Providers that do not receive any notification from the JCRA at this time can assume they are not within scope of the Security Measures Order and therefore will not be required to demonstrate compliance with the Code of Practice.

[3.123.11](#) From 2026, the JCRA will expand the use of data it collects to include establishing and notifying Providers in scope of the Security Measures Order, including assessing movement in or out under the Security Measures Order's qualifying criteria.

[3.133.12](#) The telecoms security framework established by the Amending Regulations encompasses Providers of electronic communications services that may not require a telecoms licence under the Law. Where the JCRA becomes aware of any Provider in this category, it will use information gathering powers under Article 24ZC of the Law to establish whether they are in scope of the Security Measures Order and therefore required to demonstrate compliance with the Code of Practice.

## **A supervisory model**

[3.143.13](#) Through the telecoms security framework, the Minister introduced significant enhancements to help strengthen and protect Jersey's vital communications sector for the benefit of the Island, its economy, organisations and inhabitants. The JCRA recognises it is likely to take time for Providers to make the improvements necessary to

deliver the benefits intended by the telecoms security framework given the potential scale of change needed.

[3.153.14](#) The JCRA further recognises that threats faced by Providers are continually changing as technologies and threats evolve. Risk management is therefore never complete and requires Providers to develop and maintain a strong internal security culture leading to continuous improvement.

[3.163.15](#) The telecoms security framework establishes the steps that Providers [within scope of the Security Measures Order designated by the Minister](#) must take to achieve compliance with the Law and the Security Measures Order. Through its supervisory model, the JCRA will [initially use statutory information gathering powers to](#) monitor progress that each Provider is making towards implementing appropriate organisational and technical measures with sufficient pace, as they continue to work towards full compliance.

[3.16](#) Where the JCRA finds areas of concern, it will seek to work with Providers [through informal engagement](#) to ensure appropriate and proportionate measures are implemented in accordance with the telecoms security framework. The JCRA expects that this collaborative approach will foster more compliant behaviours and reduce the volume of breaches under the Law, as well as reducing the need for regulatory investigations.

[3.17](#) [If the JCRA determines there are reasonable grounds to suspect a Provider is not taking appropriate and proportionate measures to act in accordance with the Code of Practice, it may use its powers under 24R of the Law to notify its concerns and give an opportunity for the Provider to explain its position.](#)

[3.18](#) [The JCRA will assess information received in response to a notification under 24R of the Law in conjunction with the other information it holds to determine whether to take further steps, which may include issuing an assessment notice which can require the Provider to carry out testing, attend a formal interview, permit onsite observation, etc.](#)

[3.173.19](#) As necessary, the JCRA will also stand ready to engage its suite of enforcement powers [at any relevant time within the supervisory framework](#), with the approach to enforcement set out in Section 5 of the Procedural Guidance.

## Gathering information to assess compliance

### Legal framework

[3.183.20](#) Article 24ZC of the Law provides the JCRA with broad powers to gather any information it considers necessary to carry out its functions under the Law, including:

- (a) To assess whether a Provider is complying or has complied with its telecoms security duties under Articles 24K to 24N, 24R and 24T and issuing appropriate notices;
- (b) To prepare a report to the Minister under Article 24Z; and
- (c) For the purpose of assessing the risk of a security compromise occurring in relation to a PECN or PECS;
- (d) To facilitate the provision of security information by requiring a Provider:
  - i. To produce, generate or obtain information;
  - ii. To collect or retain information that the person would not otherwise collect or retain; or
  - iii. To process, collate or analyse any information held by the person (including information the person has been required to collect or retain) for the purpose of producing or generating information to be provided to the JCRA.

[3.193.21](#) The security information that the JCRA can require can include information under Article 24ZC(4)(e) concerning future developments of a PECN or PECS that could have an impact on the security of the network or service.

### **The JCRA's general policy for assessing compliance**

[3.203.22](#) The JCRA intends relying primarily on statutory information requests issued under 24ZC of the Law (**Information Request Notices**) to build its ~~initial~~ understanding of each Provider's compliance with the telecoms security duties, which includes any adherence to the Code of Practice. The JCRA has a wide range of other powers that it can use where necessary to collect additional information about compliance, such as assessment notices issued under Schedule 2, Part 2, 1(1-3) of the Law and notifications directing a Provider to give a statement to the JCRA under Article 24R explaining whether they have failed to act in accordance with guidance given by the Minister in the Code of Practice, and why.

[3.213.23](#) The JCRA recognises that the systematic use of Information Request Notices within the telecoms security framework will be a mostly new process for Providers. For this reason, the JCRA would normally expect to send notices in draft form for review and comment where timescales allow and it is appropriate to do so, before sending a final notice. The JCRA also expects to refine information requested through the Information Request Notice process as it gains experience of the process, such as the level of detail required or the extent of information gathered in a notice.

[3.223.24](#) The JCRA recognises that the process of building its understanding of compliance is a new practice for both itself and Providers and that the telecoms security framework requirements covered by the Security Measures Order and the Code of Practice may require Providers to plan and implement considerable changes to the delivery of their networks and services. The JCRA has designed its compliance monitoring regime based on this, employing a multi-stage approach through which it expects Providers to demonstrate their compliance with the Security Measures over several tranches and in line with the Minister’s timeframe established in the Code of Practice. The JCRA may also refine the compliance monitoring process based on experience gained through implementation and operation.

[3.233.25](#) An initial step on the compliance monitoring process will be for the JCRA to build a comprehensive understanding of Providers’ networks and services to establish those in scope of the telecoms security framework, and the various functions and assets they comprise. This will provide the JCRA with a clear understanding of each Provider’s full range of “security critical functions” (as defined in the Security Measures Order), and which of these are “network oversight functions” (as defined in the Code of Practice). Based on this understanding, the JCRA will be able to assess whether the Provider is taking appropriate measures to protect each of them.

[3.243.26](#) Concurrently with activities to understand the scope of networks and services, the JCRA will request information to understand the measures each Provider has in place in order to meet its obligations under the Law and the Security Measures Order. The Law requires the JCRA to take relevant provisions of the Code of Practice into account when assessing compliance, so information requested will be primarily intended to help establish:

- (i) The extent to which measures the Provider has in place, or is planning to put in place, align with those in the Code of Practice; and
- (ii) Any alternative or additional measures which Providers might take to comply with their security framework duties.

Alongside asking about the measures a Provider has in place, the JCRA may also ask for relevant documentation or other information describing or demonstrating a measure.

[3.253.27](#) The JCRA expects to use Information Request Notices issued directly to Providers to gather most of the information needed to assess compliance with the telecoms security framework obligations. However, Article 24ZC(1) of the Law also allows the JCRA to gather information from other relevant persons, which include:

- (i) Other public communications Providers;

- (ii) Persons supplying electronic communication apparatus;
- (iii) Persons making associated facilities available to others; and
- (iv) Any other person the JCRA believes relevant.

[3.263.28](#) The JCRA may choose to use other powers under the Law if it has concerns that Information Request Notices issued as part of its regular compliance monitoring programme, both to Providers and others, are not providing the required information. These powers include:

- (i) the JCRA’s power under Article 24R of the Law to direct Providers to explain any failure to act in accordance with guidance given by the Minister in the Code of Practice; and
- (ii) The JCRA’s powers under Schedule 2, Part 1 to give assessment notices (which are covered in the Procedural Guidance below).

[3.273.29](#) The JCRA recognises that demonstrating complete compliance with telecoms security framework obligations from the outset may be challenging for Providers, given its scope and scale. The Code of Practice sets out several dates spanning ~~2028~~2027 to 2030, reflecting the Minister’s expected timescales for implementing the different measures specified by the Security Measures Order. The JCRA will put in place a progressive compliance monitoring programme, which includes several rounds of information gathering and assessment with each building toward gaining a complete understanding of a Provider’s compliance with security measures required by the Security Measures Order and based on the obligations and timeline contained in the Code of Practice. Through this programme, the JCRA will track progress and receive early warnings of any potential compliance concerns.

## The JCRA’s information-gathering programme

### Approach and timetable

[3.283.30](#) Each round of information requests of the JCRA’s information gathering programme will contain the following steps:

<b>Step 1</b>	The JCRA will draft the Information Request Notice and normally share with the Provider for review and comment.
<b>Step 2</b>	Accommodating any relevant comments received, the JCRA will issue the statutory Information Request Notice to the Provider.
<b>Step 3</b>	The Provider responds to the Information Request Notice providing the required information in the specified format and by the stated time.

**Step 4** The JCRA will review the information received and may follow-up with clarification requirements through informal meetings and correspondence with the Provider or through further Information Request Notices.

The JCRA expects to begin its first round of information requests following starting its duties under the telecoms security framework and not substantially earlier than 12-months before the first dates for completed designated measures in the Code of Practice~~within three months of starting its duties under the telecoms security framework~~, to cover gaining understanding of Providers' networks and services and compliance against a first round of security measures. The JCRA plans to release subsequent information requests at ~~12-month~~nine-month intervals with around ~~five~~six requests expected to cover all Code of Practice measures. The intention behind the multiple requests is to help keep the burden imposed by each manageable.

3.293.31 The above approach may need amending dependent on many factors, such as:

- any specific compliance concerns arising, for example, from reported security compromises or previously received information;
- any new threats, and associated security measures, that arise; or
- any concerns about the information received, such as in relation to its completeness, accuracy or quality.

### **Follow up meetings**

3.303.32 The JCRA may need to improve its understanding of a Provider's compliance through seeking clarification on information received or request additional information beyond that included in a written response to an Information Request Notice. Where appropriate, the JCRA expects to do this via correspondence and meetings, with Providers receiving reasonable notice of any such meetings. The JCRA will aim to limit them to those it considers necessary to develop a sufficiently thorough understanding of the measures taken by Providers to comply with their security duties.

### **Handling sensitive data**

3.313.33 The JCRA will use an appropriate platform to securely receive, process and store confidential information received from Providers under the telecoms security framework. Providers will receive operational arrangements for supplying sensitive data when the JCRA issues Information Request Notices.

### **Information sharing**

[3.323.34](#) The JCRA provides information on its approach to sharing information relating to the telecoms security framework, including information received through its compliance monitoring programme, in Section 6 of the Procedural Guidance.

## Testing

### Introduction

[3.333.35](#) The Security Measures Order requires Providers to carry out tests at regular intervals designed to identify the risk of security compromises. These tests must involve simulating techniques that might be used by a person seeking to cause a security compromise. The Code of Practice provides further information to help Providers understand testing requirements.

[3.343.36](#) In general, the JCRA expects Providers to be fully aware of and comply with their testing obligations under the Security Measures Order. This part of the Procedural Guidance provides further information on how the JCRA expects to use its powers under Schedule 2, Part 1 of the Law to monitor compliance.

### Relevant legal framework

[3.353.37](#) Under Schedule 2, Part 1 of the Law, the JCRA has the power to carry out, or commission others to carry out, an assessment of whether a Provider is complying with (or has complied with) the security duties under the Law. Schedule 2, Part 1, 1(3) also provides the JCRA with power to give Providers an assessment notice for the purpose of carrying out an assessment. In particular, these powers include requiring a Provider to:

- carry out specified tests or tests of a specified description in relation to the network or service;
- make arrangements of a specified description for another person to carry out specified tests or tests of a specified description in relation to the network or service;

[3.363.38](#) A test required by an assessment notice may include tests which risk causing a security compromise, or loss to a person or damage to property, but only if the test uses techniques which might be expected to be used by a person seeking to cause a security compromise.

### The JCRA's general policy

#### Testing requirements

[3.373.39](#) The Code of Practice explains the purpose of testing, or “red team” exercising, is to verify the security defences of the network and identify any security weaknesses prior to any potential attackers. For this reason, it is essential that the testing simulates, so far as possible, real world attacks. The Code provides guidance on the criteria any test should have in place to achieve this.

[3.383.40](#) The JCRA expects Providers to voluntarily establish a testing regime that meets the criteria set out in the Code of Practice and referred to above. In particular, testing should simulate an advanced attack against a Provider’s critical infrastructure and assets, usually drawing from four different scenarios:

- Attack from the Internet;
- An attacker with insider privileges;
- An attack through a 3rd party service provider; and
- An attack against physical infrastructure (if applicable).

[3.393.41](#) The JCRA may require Providers to report on their structured testing regime and results of testing and, based on results, may require them to develop and share a mitigation plan to address the findings and works.

## Failure to follow the Code of Practice

### Relevant legal framework

[3.403.42](#) Failure to act in accordance with a provision of the Code of Practice does not of itself make a Provider liable to legal proceedings. However, under Article 24R(1) the JCRA may notify a Provider where it has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the Provider is failing or has failed to act in accordance with a Code of Practice provision. The notification must:

- Set out (i) the relevant provision(s) of the Code of Practice and (ii) the respects in which the Provider is suspected to be failing, or to have failed, to act in accordance with such provision(s); and
- Direct the Provider to give a statement in response.

[3.413.43](#) In its statement, the Provider must confirm whether or not it is failing, or has failed, to act in accordance with a provision of the Code of Practice and explain the reasons for its response.

### The JCRA’s general policy

[3.423.44](#) In the first instance, it is for Providers themselves to determine how their security duties affect their activities and take any necessary measures in order to comply with them. Therefore, the JCRA expects Providers to take proactive steps to meet their regulatory obligations.

[3.433.45](#) As explained above, the JCRA intends relying primarily on statutory Information Request Notices as the basis of its compliance monitoring framework. As part of this, the JCRA will ask Providers for information to assess whether they are complying with their security duties, taking into account any relevant provisions set out in the Code of Practice. Where this or other information gives the JCRA reasonable grounds to suspect Providers are not acting in accordance with the Code of Practice, it may use its power under Article 24R. The JCRA will use the information provided to inform its compliance assessments and when considering any subsequent enforcement action.

[3.443.46](#) In practice, the JCRA expects Providers to engage constructively with its routine monitoring processes and provide a clear picture of the steps they are taking towards compliance when providing information in response to Information Request Notices. Therefore, the JCRA only anticipates using its power under Article 24R where it considers that a clear statement from a Provider of the type required under 24R is necessary for the JCRA to consider whether further escalation might be appropriate. Any use of this power will take into account the implementation timelines attached to provisions in the Code of Practice.

## Assessments

### Relevant legal framework

#### Duties specified in the JCRA's assessment notices

[3.453.47](#) Schedule 2, Part 1 of the Law sets out the JCRA's powers to assess Providers' compliance with their security duties and gives the JCRA the power to carry out, or commission others to carry out, an assessment of whether a Provider is complying with (or has complied with) the security duties in Articles 24K to 24N, 24S and 24T. Providers have a duty to cooperate with an assessment and are also required to pay the JCRA's reasonably incurred costs in connection with the assessment.

[3.463.48](#) Schedule 2, Part 1, 1(3) provides the JCRA with the power to give Providers an assessment notice for the purpose of carrying out an assessment. It sets out what an assessment notice may require a Provider to do and may specifically require a Provider to:

- Carry out specified tests (or tests of a specified description) in relation to the network or service (covered earlier in this section);
- Make arrangements for another person to carry out specified tests (or tests of a specified description) in relation to the network or service;
- Make people available for interview that must be those of a specified description who are involved in the provision of the network or service and must not exceed the number who are willing to be interviewed; and
- Permit authorised persons to enter specified premises for various purposes (this power of entry is discussed in more detail in the “Power to enter premises” part of the Procedural Guidance below).

[3.473.49](#) Schedule 2, Part 1, 2 allows the JCRA to issue an assessment notice which requires that the Provider must comply with a duty urgently, in which case the usual rules regarding the timeframe for complying with a duty and how this may be affected by an appeal do not apply. Schedule 2, Part 1, 3 also makes provision for a Provider to apply to the court for an order that the duty in such an urgent notice does not need to be complied with urgently, and/or a change to the time at which (or period within which) the duty must be complied with.

### **The JCRA’s general policy**

[3.483.50](#) As noted above, there may be circumstances where the use of the JCRA’s broader suite of powers under the Law, such as the power to issue assessment notices, is necessary. These powers allow for a range of activities, such as carrying out tests on a network or service, interviewing staff, visiting premises and observing or inspecting operations, documents and information.

[3.493.51](#) While the JCRA expects to gather the majority of information through its routine monitoring using Information Request Notices, it may, in some circumstances, decide it is appropriate to use an assessment notice to inform the JCRA’s assessment of a Provider’s compliance with their security duties.

[3.52](#) ~~The JCRA recognises~~ Recognising that complying with an assessment notice may require more substantial effort or additional costs for Providers than responding to receiving Information Request Notices or providing a statement in response to one, the JCRA will normally seek to initially issue a draft assessment notice as part of its compliance monitoring process. This may include the following information:

- An explanation of the reasons for planning to issue a formal assessment notice;
- The chosen assessment method and reasons for its selection;

- The expected requirements on the Providers including timeframe for completing the assessment activity;
- The anticipated outcome of the assessment activity and potential next steps;
- A request for the Provider to assess and provide the JCRA with its reasonable external costs associated with carrying out the assessment; and
- An opportunity for the Provider to propose an alternative assessment approach they consider appropriate for achieving the same outcome.

3.53 The JCRA will review any response from a provider to a draft assessment notice and will take information received into account before deciding to proceed with the assessment. However, for the avoidance of doubt, nothing contained in this process limits the JCRA’s power to issue assessment notices.

3.503.54 Where appropriate, the JCRA may also use assessment notices to inform its enforcement activity and reminds that Providers have a duty to cooperate with an assessment under the Law and holds the view that this would include not doing anything to disrupt an assessment, such as destroying documents to which access is sought or interfering with testing required by an assessment notice. The JCRA has powers to enforce any breach of this duty of co-operation under Schedule 2, Part 2, 8(3).

## Entering premises

### Legal framework

#### Duties specified in the JCRA’s assessment notices

3.513.55 As part of the JCRA’s powers to assess Providers’ compliance with their security duties, Schedule 2 permits it to issue assessment notices that require Providers to do various things, which include permitting an employee of the JCRA or other person authorised by the JCRA (an “authorised person”) to enter non-domestic premises for various purposes. Specifically:

- To observe any relevant operations taking place;
- To direct an authorised person to relevant equipment or other material or documents of a specified description;
- To assist an authorised person to view information of a specified description that is capable of being viewed using equipment on the premises;
- To comply with a request from an authorised person for a copy of the documents to which the person is directed and the information the person is assisted to view;

- To permit an authorised person to inspect or examine the documents, information, equipment or material to which the person is directed or which the person is assisted to view; and
- To provide an authorised person with an explanation of such documents, information, equipment or material.

### **Referring to the JCRA's exercise of its power of entry in its security reports**

3.523.56 Article 24Z (5)(g) of the Law requires the JCRA to include a statement which sets out the number of occasions on which premises have been entered in its annual report to the Minister.

### **The JCRA's general policy**

3.57 In exercising its powers of entry, and having regard to any relevant legislation or guidance provided in this area, the JCRA expects to use the following framework:~~to have regard to any relevant legislation or guidance provided in this area.~~

- (a) The option to enter a Provider's premises will be carefully considered before making an evidence-based decision to proceed.
- (b) Providers will receive reasonable advanced notice of the JCRA's intention to enter its premises (usually not less than 48-hours) including specifying the date and time of arrival.
- (c) The advanced notice will name the persons or persons who will be entering the premises, and they will carry appropriate verification ID.
- (d) The advanced notice will explain why the JCRA has chosen to enter the premises, and state the activities that will be carried out once inside and assistance required.
- (e) The Provider must commit to ensuring suitable representatives are available at the premises to allow entry and remain with the JCRA's representative(s) throughout, and to provide the required assistance.
- (f) The JCRA's representative(s) would make a record detailing the circumstances associated with the entry and detail the information obtained.

3.533.58 The JCRA will set out the number of times premises have been entered during the course of each financial year in its annual report.

## 4 Reporting security compromises

### Introduction

4.1 Under the Law, Providers have a duty to report the risk and occurrence of security compromises, which encompasses both resilience and cyber related incidents. This requires them to notify users and the JCRA about the significant risk of security compromise and to report security compromises to the JCRA. This section explains the JCRA's expectations of Providers in relation to these duties and contains the following contents:

- Informing of the significant risk of a security compromise; and
- Reporting the occurrence of a security compromise.

### Informing of the significant risk of security compromise

#### Relevant legal framework

4.2 Under Article 24S of the Law, Providers must take reasonable and proportionate steps to inform users who may be adversely affected by any significant risk of security compromise of a PECN or PECS. The relevant information to provide users is:

- The existence of the risk;
- The nature of the security compromise;
- The technical measures that it may be reasonably practicable for such users to take in response to prevent, remedy or mitigate the adverse effect that the security compromise would have on them; and
- The name and contact details of a person who may provide further information.

4.3 Under Article 24S(2)(b) of the Law Telecoms Providers must also notify and provide the JCRA with the same relevant information relating to the risk of security compromise.

4.4 Under Article 24S(4) of the Law, the Minister may subsequently by order specify a minimum time by which Providers must take the steps to bring the relevant information to the attention of affected persons and the JCRA.

#### The JCRA's general policy on the risk of security compromise

##### Duty to inform users

4.5 The duty to inform users of the risk of a security compromise applies where there is both:

(a) A "significant risk of a security compromise occurring"; and

(b) Where such a security compromise may adversely affect users.

Providers are likely to be aware of many potential vulnerabilities within their networks and services, most of which are unlikely to result in an actual security compromise, or even if they did, they would be unlikely to have an adverse effect on users. Therefore, where Providers have reasonable grounds for believing that a vulnerability within the network or service is unlikely to result in an actual security compromise, or even if it did, it would be unlikely to have an adverse effect on users, the JCRA would not expect users to be informed of such matters under Article 24S.

4.6 Providers should consider a number of factors when determining whether to inform users about a significant risk of security compromise, including:

- Does the risk arise from a vulnerability for which there is a known means to exploit and/or any known active exploitation?
- How difficult would it be to exploit any vulnerability that gives rise to the risk?
- Are there any actors likely to be able to exploit any related vulnerability and likely to do so in a way which adversely affects users of the network or service?

4.7 If the Provider determines there is indeed a significant risk of a security compromise occurring, and that users may be adversely affected by this, the Provider must take steps to inform relevant users. What will be required by Article 24S will depend on what is reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances for the purpose of bringing the relevant information to the attention of those users that may be adversely affected. Generally, there are two broad categories as to the approach that might be adopted:

- Direct contact. This could, for example, be via an email, letter or telephone call to each potentially affected user of the network or service; and
- Indirect contact. This could, for example, involve publishing a notice on the Provider's website in a location that is well signposted.

4.8 Factors which the JCRA considers are likely to make direct contact more appropriate include:

- Where the security compromise could be reasonably expected to cause significant harm to the users;
- Where there are measures that could reasonably be taken by a typical user which would significantly reduce or eliminate a serious adverse effect from the security compromise;

- Where no such measures exist, but the user could mitigate the risk to themselves by making a decision to move to an alternative Provider.

4.9 Providers must ensure that direct contact takes into consideration vulnerable customers' preferences and requirements for direct contact, and not rely on a one size fits all communication approach. The JCRA considers vulnerable customers to be users that the Provider has been informed of or should otherwise reasonably be aware may be vulnerable due to circumstances such as age, physical or learning disability, physical or mental illness, low literacy or communications difficulties.

### **Duty to notify the JCRA**

4.10 When communicating with users about the significant risk of a security compromise, Providers must also notify the JCRA of the relevant information being shared. Information on how and what to report to the JCRA in these circumstances is shown below, along with further details.

### **How to report a significant risk of compromise**

- 4.11 Providers should submit the relevant information about a significant risk of a security compromise using a secure communication method specified by the JCRA at the same time they communicate with users.
- 4.12 Providers may also choose to provide the JCRA with further supplementary information about the risk if they consider appropriate for helping the JCRA better understand relevant circumstances or details. Providers sharing any supplementary information should use the secure communication method specified by the JCRA for this purpose.

### **Data required**

- 4.13 Each significant risk of compromise report should include the relevant information being shared with users, which is:
- The existence of the risk;
  - The nature of the security compromise;
  - The technical measures that it may be reasonably practicable for such users to take in response to prevent, remedy or mitigate the adverse effect that the security compromise would have on them; and
  - The name and contact details of a person who may provide further information.

### **Follow-up actions or requirements in response to a significant risk of security compromise report**

- 4.14 After receiving a significant risk of security compromise report, the JCRA may contact the Provider to request further details. These could include further information on the nature of the risk and the Provider's actual/planned response.
- 4.15 The JCRA expects Providers to manage any significant risk of security compromise appropriately under duties imposed by the Law. Should the JCRA consider the Provider has not handled a significant risk of compromise to its satisfaction, the JCRA may decide to use its assessment and enforcement powers set out in Schedule 2 of the Law to address any possible shortcomings.

### **Information sharing**

- 4.16 The JCRA provides information on its approach to sharing information relating to the telecoms security framework, including information received through reports of significant risks of security compromise, in Section 6 of the Procedural Guidance.

## **Reporting the occurrence of security compromise**

### **Legal framework**

- 4.17 Article 24T(1) of the Law requires Providers to inform the JCRA as soon as reasonably practicable of any security compromise that:
- Has a significant effect on the operation of the network or service; or
  - Involves unauthorised access to, interference with or exploitation of the network or service so that a person is put in a position to bring about a further security compromise that would have a significant effect on the operation of the network or service.
- 4.18 Article 24T(2) of the Law requires Providers to take account of a number of factors in determining whether the effect that a security compromise has, or would have, on the operation of a network or service is significant for the purposes of complying with their reporting obligation. These factors are:
- (a) The length of the period during which the operation of the network or service is or would be affected;
  - (b) The number of persons who use the network or service that are or would be affected by the effect on the operation of the network or service;
  - (c) The size and location of the geographical area within which persons who use the network or service are or would be affected by the effect on the operation of the network or service; and

(d) The extent to which activities of persons who use the network or service are or would be affected by the effect on the operation of the network or service.

4.19 Under Article 24T(3) of the Law, the Minister may by order specify a minimum time by when Providers take steps to inform the JCRA of any reportable occurrence of security compromise.

### **The JCRA's general policy**

4.20 Article 24T of the Law places a requirement on all Providers of PECNs and PECSs to report security compromises to the JCRA. This supersedes any existing reporting requirements established between the JCRA and Providers or stated in any previous guidance or agreements and applies to all Providers whether they are obliged to demonstrate compliance with the telecoms security framework or not.

4.21 The JCRA recognises this incident reporting requirement and the criteria and time limits established in this section of the Procedural Guidance are likely to involve an increased level of reporting activity by Providers and potential subsequent engagement with the JCRA to understand the nature and impact of security compromises. However, the Minister has responded to a changing security situation by introducing the Amending Regulations, and therefore the JCRA expects Providers to understand and comply with incident reporting requirements.

4.22 Under Article 24K(2)(a) of the Law, security compromises required to be reported to the JCRA include “anything that compromises the availability, performance or functionality of the network or service”. The JCRA expects the majority of these to be network or services outages arising from equipment or process failures or similar, and causing “availability” or “resilience” incidents.

4.23 The definition of security compromise in Article 24K(2) of the Law includes a number of situations other than network or service outages, many of which are typically associated with cyber-security incidents. In particular, those described in Article 24K(2)(b)-(f), which cover aspects such as confidentiality and integrity. This means that any security compromises, including those related to cyber-security incidents, which meet the criteria in Article 24T must be reported in addition to the reporting of network or service outages. Examples of confidentiality and integrity related incidents include any instances where an attacker has infiltrated the network, is using the network for their own purposes or is stealing data. Some examples of the type of incidents that would likely be reportable are found in Table 3 below.

4.24 The JCRA notes in particular that Article 24T(1)(b) states that the following is also reportable:

“any security compromise within Article 24K(2)(b) that puts any person in a position to be able to bring about a further security compromise that would have a significant effect on the operation of the network or service.”


4.25 Therefore, any event that puts any person in a position, however briefly, to be able to bring about a further security compromise that would have a significant effect, must also be reported (even if the defences put in place by the Provider make a further attack unlikely to succeed). An example of such a situation would be where an attacker had gained access to a system, which they could have used to mount a further attack and cause significant effect.

4.26 The remainder of this section sets out further guidance for Providers on:

- Which security compromises to report, through qualitative criteria and numerical thresholds for what constitutes a reportable security compromise;
- When to report, with guidance on expected reporting timeframes for urgent and non-urgent security compromises; and
- How to report security compromises.

4.27 Figure 2 below illustrates the end to end process for reporting security compromises.

*Figure 2: Reporting security compromises schematic*



### Which security compromises to report

4.28 The qualitative criteria and numerical thresholds set out below, which have been developed taking into account the factors listed in Article 24T(2) of the Law, explains the JCRA’s view of which security compromises are likely to be significant and should therefore be reported to the JCRA. If any one of the criteria or thresholds is met, the

Provider should submit a security compromise report. The JCRA has the power to take enforcement action where this does not happen in accordance with the statutory requirements.

4.29 Reportable security compromises are as follows:

- Any security compromises impacting service availability, which meet the thresholds set out in Table 1 or Table 2 below;
- Any security compromises affecting networks or services involved in connecting emergency calls (e.g. Call Handling Agent platforms, emergency call routing, etc.) and leading to a reduction in the usual ability to answer or correctly route calls;
- Any security compromises that the Provider is aware of that have a link to a potential loss of life;
- Any security compromises involving significant cyber security breaches (see illustrative examples in Table 3 below);
- Any security compromises reported to other Government agencies or departments;
- Any security compromises that Providers are aware of being reported in the media (Jersey, UK or trade news sources).

*Table 1: Fixed network numerical thresholds*

Network/service type	Minimum number of end users affected <sup>1</sup>	Minimum duration of service loss or major disruption
Fixed network providing access to the emergency services	100	1 hour
Fixed network providing access to the emergency services	1,000	Any duration
Fixed voice or data service/network offered to retail customers	100 or 25% <sup>2</sup>	8 hours

Fixed voice or data service/network offered to retail customers	1,000	1 hour
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*Notes on Table 1:*

1. A user is affected if the main functions of a network or service are not available to them due to the security compromise.
2. This threshold should be interpreted as either 1,000 end users or 25% of the Provider's total number of end users on the affected service, whichever is the lowest number.

*Table 2: Mobile network numerical thresholds*

Network/service type	Minimum number of end users affected <sup>1</sup>	Minimum duration of service loss or major disruption
Mobile network providing access to the emergency services	100	1 hour
Mobile network providing access to the emergency services <sup>2</sup>	1,000	Any duration
MVNO voice or data service/network offered to retail customers <sup>3</sup>	25% <sup>2</sup>	8 hours
MNO voice or data service/network offered to retail customers	1,000	1 hour

*Notes on Table 2:*

1. A user is affected if the main functions of a network or service are not available to them due to the security compromise.
2. A mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) should report security compromises affecting its end users, even where security compromises are the result of a failure in its host mobile network operator's (MNO's) network. In this case, the third party's details should be provided.

3. *This threshold should be interpreted as 25% of the Provider’s total number of end users on the affected service.*

4.30 For illustrative purposes, Table 3 below sets out a list of examples of cyber-security compromises which the JCRA expects would have been reportable under Article 24T of the Law, if suffered by a Provider. It is non-exhaustive, and Providers should monitor for other categories of cyber-security compromise and report to the JCRA for information and consideration. The JCRA reminds Providers that resilience incidents are also reportable.

*Table 3: Examples of cyber-security compromises*

Category	Explanation
Supply chain compromise	Products used in a Provider’s network/service are compromised, as a result of an attack on the supplier.
Successful Exploitation of Vulnerability	An external attacker carrying out a targeted internet-based attack.
Physical attacks	Attacks with a starting point in physical assets such as a base station or street cabinet. This could lead to loss of service or give the attacker physical or logical access to security critical functions (SCFs) or network oversight functions (NOFs).
Managed service-based attack	An external attack via a Managed Service Provider (MSP) used by the Provider. This could be via a malicious employee from the MSP or because the MSP has had a security compromise, that facilitates an attack into a Provider.
Malicious insider attack	A malicious attack that has been perpetrated by an insider on the company network or by an insider who has been influenced by an external threat actor.
Ransomware	Either a targeted or “random” attack that encrypts data for ransom and/or extracts data for ransom.
Internet routing protocol abuse	When attackers reroute internet traffic (maliciously, or due to misconfiguration). Examples include BGP hijacking and DNS poisoning.
Security misconfiguration	Systems are not correctly/insufficiently secured leaving an exploitable loophole/vulnerability (either accidentally or due to a process failure).
Phishing and other social engineering	Targeted or randomly directed e-mails, or other communications, that successfully gets victims to install malware, remote access,

Category	Explanation
	etc., to share their credentials, or otherwise leads to unauthorised entities gaining access.

4.31 For the avoidance of doubt, any cyber-security compromise which results in service disruption of the types set out in Tables 1 and 2 should be reported, regardless of whether or not it aligns to any category in Table 3 (which, as stated, is non-exhaustive).

### When to report

4.32 It is important that Providers have adequate processes in place to ensure that reporting is routinely performed and that this reporting continues in all circumstances.

4.33 The JCRA expects Providers to make an initial notification in relation to urgent security compromises as soon as possible and usually within 24-hours of the Provider becoming aware of them. The JCRA expects [the primary purpose of](#) this initial notification ~~is simply~~ to acknowledge that the Provider is aware of a security compromise, and give an indication of its nature. [Providers are not expected to supply all the information defined in paragraphs 4.423-4.625 \(below\) but Any](#) other information that is readily available will be welcomed. Following this initial notification, the JCRA then expects the full report to be provided within 72-hours.

4.34 The JCRA accepts that, particularly where urgent action is required outside of office hours, this will be a best-efforts activity and not always possible given timing and resource constraints. In the event the JCRA has not received a notification from a Provider, and becomes aware of a security compromise appearing to the JCRA as requiring urgent action, it will normally seek to make enquiries via the contact point it has been given by the Provider.

4.35 Security compromises should be notified as “urgent” if they meet any of the following criteria:

- Any security compromises impacting service availability, which meet the thresholds set out in Table 1 (fixed network), Table 2 (mobile network) and require urgent remedial action.
- All security compromises involving significant cyber security breaches that are reportable under the "Reportable security compromises" criteria above and which require urgent remedial action.
- Security compromises affecting services to 15,000 or more end users.

- Security compromises affecting services to end users which exceed 5,000 user hours. This should be based on the combination of duration of service loss/disruption and the number of end users affected. Referring to Tables 1 (fixed network) and 2 (mobile network) above, this would be calculated by multiplying columns 2 and 3 in each.
- Security compromises attracting mainstream media coverage, regardless of whether they meet the quantitative thresholds in Tables 1 and 2.
- Security compromises affecting critical Government or local public sector services (e.g. wide spread impact on 999, emergency services communications, etc.).

4.36 Any single security compromise that is likely to affect the provision of wholesale services to both fixed and mobile Providers.

4.37 The JCRA expects non-urgent security compromises to be reported within 72 hours of the Provider becoming aware of them. This should include all security compromises affecting services to end users which exceed 2,500 user hours. This should be based on the combination of duration of service loss/disruption and the number of end users affected. Referring to Tables 1 (fixed) and 2 (mobile) above, this would be calculated by multiplying columns 2 and 3 in each.

### **How to report**

4.38 Notification of urgent security compromises should be made using the secure communication method specified by the JCRA. This should then be followed by a normal security compromise report using the same secure method.

4.39 All other security compromise reports should be made, whenever possible, within 72 hours of the Provider becoming aware of them and include the information described in the rest of this section and be submitted using the secure communication method specified by the JCRA. Where full or final information is not available at the time of reporting, updated reports can be provided as further information becomes available.

4.40 Those Providers notified by the Government as needing to demonstrate compliance with the Code of Practice requirements should provide the JCRA with a contact point for urgent enquiries about significant security compromises. This will allow the JCRA to make contact with those Providers where it becomes aware of a significant security compromise which has not yet been reported.

### **Data required**

4.41 Every occurrence of security compromise report sent to the JCRA should contain the information below.

#### **1. Provider name**

4.42 The full name of the Provider.

## **2. Provider security compromise reference number**

4.43 A unique reference number that can be used to identify the security compromise in communications with the Provider.

## **3. Date and time of occurrence**

4.44 The date and time that the security compromise commenced formatted as: dd/mm/yyyy hh:mm

## **4. Date and time of resolution**

4.45 The date and time that the security compromise was fully resolved, formatted as: dd/mm/yyyy hh:mm. Where the security compromise is ongoing at the time of reporting, the resolution time may be provided when it is available.

## **5. Location**

4.46 The location or locations affected by the security compromise, i.e. Island-wide, parish, district, area, post code, etc. Providers should choose a relevant and understandable description wherever appropriate to explain the geographical area experiencing the service interruption.

4.47 In the case of mobile security compromises resulting in the loss of a technology (e.g. 2G, 3G, 4G or 5G) or service (e.g. voice, data) at specific cell sites, a full list of the affected sites should be provided.

## **6. Brief description of security compromise**

4.48 Provide a short summary of the security compromise, including any relevant information not captured elsewhere in the report.

## **7. Impact**

### *Services affected*

4.49 Provide full details of the services affected. This should identify services as understood by customers, for example telephony, broadband, 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G, etc.

### *Number/proportion of users affected*

4.50 Provide details of the number of users affected by the security compromise. The information provided should be as accurate as is technically feasible at the time of reporting. If a reporting threshold was met under one of the “percentage of users affected” criteria, the Provider should provide the number affected and the percentage of its end users for this service that this represents.

- 4.51 The Provider should provide details of the total number of affected users against every service associated with a security compromise, even where that service did not meet specific thresholds. For example, for a security compromise which exceeds a voice threshold and also affects data users – but does not exceed a data threshold – the number of data end users affected should be included in the report.
- 4.52 Where the impact of a security compromise varies over time, effort should be made to explain how this was the case.
- 4.53 Where exact numbers are not available (for example due to a mobile cell site failure), the Provider should use historical data to estimate the number of end users affected.
- 4.54 Providers that offer wholesale products to other Providers may have little or no visibility of the number of end users affected by a security compromise within their network or service. The JCRA does not expect a Provider to alter their monitoring or reporting systems to obtain this information. However, where it is clear to the Provider that a security compromise is likely to result in service loss to end users which will exceed the reporting thresholds, they are encouraged to report this.
- 4.55 A Provider should report qualifying security compromises affecting any service it sells, even if another Provider fulfils the service. However, where a Provider’s users use additional services over the top of the network or service it provides, but without its direct involvement, the JCRA would not expect the Provider to monitor or report any security compromises affecting such additional services.

#### *Networks and assets affected*

- 4.56 The Provider should provide an overview of the networks and assets affected during the security compromise. At this stage the overview should be brief but the JCRA may request further network and asset information during any subsequent investigation.

#### *Fixed and Mobile*

- 4.57 The Provider should indicate if this security compromise has had an impact on both fixed and mobile networks or services.

### **8. Summary of security compromise cause and action taken so far**

- 4.58 The Provider should explain its understanding of the cause of the security compromise, including its root cause and primary cause when these are known.
- 4.59 The Provider should provide details of action taken to manage and remedy the security compromise, and any measures taken to mitigate the risk of reoccurrence.

### **9. Third party details**

- 4.60 If the cause of the security compromise was the failure of a third party service, provide the name of the third party.
- 4.61 Additionally, indicate whether a service level or operational level agreement is in place with the third party and whether a breach occurred.

#### **10. Name and contact details for follow up**

- 4.62 Details to enable the JCRA to follow up on the security compromise if required.

#### **Follow up actions or requirements in response to a security compromise**

- 4.63 Where the JCRA believes there are aspects to a security compromise that require further investigation, it will contact the Provider to request further details. This may be through an email, a telephone call or similar, or a follow-up meeting if the JCRA believes the security compromise requires a more detailed assessment.
- 4.64 Within a follow-up meeting, the JCRA will examine all aspects of the security compromise, including the Provider's approach to risk management, the cause of the security compromise, its impact and the remedial actions taken. Where a security compromise is technically complex and requires a significant understanding of the Provider's network architecture, topology and design, the JCRA may request a presentation of this nature and use its statutory information gathering powers to gather information, if considered appropriate.
- 4.65 The measures to be taken after the occurrence of a security compromise may include actions or requirements placed on the Provider. For example, where remedying the consequences of a security compromise requires planned changes to the network, the JCRA may request regular progress updates.
- 4.66 In cases where the security compromise is not resolved to the JCRA's satisfaction, it may consider the use of assessment and enforcement powers set out in Schedule 2, Part 1 and 2 of the Law.

## 5 Enforcement

### Introduction

- 5.1 As part of ensuring compliance with the security duties set out under Articles 24K to 24N, 24R and 24TK, the JCRA is also responsible for the enforcement of such duties. This section of the Procedural Guidance explains the JCRA's approach to enforcement and contains the following content:
- Introduction
  - General approach to enforcement
  - Power to direct Providers to take interim steps
  - Power to impose penalties
- 5.2 Where the JCRA considers enforcement action is needed in association with the telecoms security framework, it will carry this out in a structured way, consistent with the Law and its own evidence-based, proportionate and consistent principles.
- 5.3 Information which may trigger an enforcement investigation can come to the JCRA's attention from a variety of sources, such as a notification by a Provider of a security compromise, through routine compliance monitoring or because of a complaint. Upon triggering the enforcement process, the JCRA will complete an initial assessment in order to determine whether to open an investigation. If an investigation is commenced, the JCRA will rely upon its statutory powers to obtain the information necessary to take appropriate enforcement action, which may include:
- i. Requiring information by issuing Security Information Notices;
  - ii. Directing Providers to make a statement specifying whether they are acting in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Practice; and
  - iii. Issuing assessment notices.
- 5.4 Where the JCRA determines that there are grounds for action, it will first provide the subject of the investigation with a provisional decision giving them an opportunity to submit representations. Having considered all of the relevant evidence and any representations, the JCRA will make a final decision on the case. Where appropriate, the JCRA may consider settling a regulatory investigation. Settlement is a voluntary process and leads to a formal, legally binding regulatory decision. Throughout the process, the JCRA may rely upon powers introduced by the Law to require Providers to take interim steps or impose a duty to take specified steps by issuing an assessment notice. Under

Schedule 2, Part 2, 6 of the Law, the JCRA also has a power to deal with urgent cases, including the power to suspend or restrict a Provider's activity.

## The JCRA's general approach to enforcement

- 5.5 In Section 3 above, the JCRA provides general guidance about how it envisages exercising its powers to issue Security Information Notices, to issue assessment notices and to direct Telecoms Providers to explain any failure to act in accordance with guidance given by the Minister in the Code of Practice. These powers may be relevant also in relation to the JCRA's enforcement process.
- 5.6 As explained above (in paragraph 3.41), the JCRA will use these powers where it considers it appropriate, reasonable and proportionate to do so.
- 5.7 Below the JCRA sets out how it generally expects to exercise its power to impose penalties and power to direct a Provider to take interim steps.

## Power to direct Providers to take interim steps

### Legal framework

#### Three-stage process

- 5.8 The Law gives the JCRA the power to impose interim steps to a Provider pending the commencement or completion of enforcement action. The process for giving interim directions involves:
- Giving a notification setting out the interim steps proposed by the JCRA;
  - Allowing the Provider an opportunity to make representations; and
  - Issuing a direction to take interim steps.

#### Notification proposing interim steps

- 5.9 The JCRA may propose interim steps to a Provider only if the conditions set out in Schedule 2, Part 2, 10 (1) of the Law are met. In summary, these conditions are as follows:
- There are reasonable grounds for believing that the Provider has contravened or is contravening a security duty under Articles 25K, 24L, 24M or 24N;
  - The JCRA either has not yet commenced enforcement action or has commenced but not completed enforcement action;
  - There are reasonable grounds for believing either, or both, that a security compromise has occurred or there is an imminent risk of a security compromise, or further security compromise, occurring; and

- It is reasonable to require the Provider to take interim steps given the seriousness or likely seriousness of the security compromise.

5.10 The nature of the “interim steps” which may be required of a Provider is set out in Schedule 2, Part 2, 10(4) of the Law. In summary, these steps include preventing the adverse effects (on the network or service or otherwise) of a security compromise (or a further security compromise), remedying or mitigating the adverse effects on the network or service of a security compromise and eliminating or reducing an imminent risk of a security compromise (or a further security compromise).

### **Representations**

5.11 The JCRA may only direct the Provider to take the interim steps once it has been given a notification under Schedule 2, Part 2, 10 of the Law, the Provider has had an opportunity to make representations about the matters notified, the period allowed for representations has expired, and after having considered any representations.

### **Direction to take interim steps**

5.12 The JCRA may only direct a Provider to take interim steps if it is satisfied that:

- There are reasonable grounds for believing that a contravention has occurred;
- There are reasonable grounds for believing that a security compromise has occurred as a result of the contravention and/or there is an imminent risk of a security compromise (or a further security compromise) occurring as a result of the contravention; and
- It is reasonable to give the direction, given the seriousness or likely seriousness of the compromise(s) or potential compromise(s).

5.13 A direction to take interim steps must include a statement of reasons and specify the time period within which each interim step must be taken. A direction cannot require a Provider to take interim steps after the completion of enforcement action by the JCRA.

5.14 The JCRA must commence or complete enforcement action as soon as reasonably practicable after a direction to take interim steps has been given.

5.15 The JCRA may, at any time, revoke or vary a direction to make it less onerous.

### **The JCRA’s general policy**

5.16 As set out above, the JCRA can impose interim steps under Schedule 2, Part 2, 10-11 of the Law only where certain conditions have been met.

5.17 As this power is intended to be used in situations where an actual, or potential, security compromise is serious, the JCRA expects to be in close dialogue with the Provider to

gather the necessary information to inform its decision on whether directing the Provider to take interim steps would be appropriate under the specific circumstances.

- 5.18 After receiving a notification setting out the interim steps proposed by the JCRA, Providers will have the opportunity to submit their representations, which will be taken into consideration prior to issuing any final directions to take interim steps. Given the urgent nature of a direction to take interim steps, the time given to make representations under Schedule 2, Part 2, 10(2)(c) is likely to be short. The JCRA's directions will include a statement of its reasons for issuing the direction as well as the time period(s) for completion of the specified interim steps.
- 5.19 The JCRA may issue such a notification and direction to take interim steps before it has commenced enforcement action, up to any point before it has completed enforcement action. Where the JCRA issues such a direction, it must as soon as reasonably practicable commence and complete enforcement action.

## Power to impose penalties

### Relevant legal framework

- 5.20 For contravention of a security duty (other than the duty to explain a failure to follow a provision in the Code of Practice under Article 24R), the JCRA may impose a penalty up to a maximum of ten percent of a Provider's "relevant turnover" or, in the case of a continuing contravention, £10,000 per day.
- 5.21 For contravention of an information requirement or refusal to explain a failure to follow a provision in the Code of Practice (under Article 24R), the JCRA may impose a penalty up to a maximum of ten percent of a Provider's "relevant turnover" or, in the case of a continuing contravention, £10,000 per day.
- 5.22 The JCRA must give Providers a period of time to make representations after giving a notification of a penalty before any confirmation decision is made.

### The JCRA's general policy

- 5.23 The JCRA will consider all the circumstances of the case in the round in order to determine the appropriate and proportionate amount of any penalty.
- 5.24 The JCRA has published penalty guidelines and will have regard to these guidelines in determining the amount of penalty to be imposed under the Law for contravention of a security duty, a failure to comply with an Information Request Notice or a refusal to explain a failure to follow a provision in the Code of Practice.

## 6 Information sharing

### Introduction

6.1 The JCRA expects to receive information from Providers in connection with the risk and occurrence of security compromises. The Law also provides the JCRA with broad information gathering powers that will be used to request information from Providers in connection with the monitoring and enforcement of the telecoms security framework. Information received or collected in these ways will be handled securely and stored appropriately. The Law also permits the JCRA to share received or collected information with others in certain circumstances and under certain conditions. This section of the Procedural Guidance explains the JCRA's approach to information sharing and contains the following content:

- Introduction
- The relevant legal framework
- The JCRA's general policy
- Specific guidance on information sharing

### The relevant legal framework

#### **Statutory gateways under the Law**

6.2 Under Article 24ZC(2) of the Law, the JCRA uses a statutory gateway to disclose information obtained in the exercise of its powers to others providing that, among other things, doing so is relevant and proportionate for the security of Jersey. Others that can receive disclosed information include:

- The Minister;
- A department of the UK government or government of any other country or territory;
- A Jersey public JCRA; and
- To another regulator in any country or territory performing a similar function as the JCRA.

6.3 The Law also provides statutory gateways for the JCRA to share or publish information it has gathered under its telecoms security functions, including:

- Under Article 24U(2), the JCRA must inform the Minister of the risk or occurrence of serious security compromises;

- Under Article 24U(3), the JCRA may inform the Minister and others of the risk or occurrence of security compromises; and
- Under Article 24Z the JCRA must provide a security report to the Minister containing information and advice that may assist in the formulation of telecoms security policy.

6.4 Nothing under Article 24ZC of the Law limits, among others, the disclosure of information under Article 24U, or prevents the publication or disclosure of a report under Article 24Z.

### The JCRA's general policy

6.5 As part of its telecoms security functions, the JCRA plans to share certain information with others involved in telecoms security for the purpose of helping the JCRA and others perform their functions. This includes:

- The Minister;
- The DoE, through the Minister, as the Government policy lead for the telecoms security sector;
- The JCSC, through the Minister, as lead for promoting and improving Jersey's cyber resilience;<sup>5</sup>
- And other Crown Dependency regulators performing a similar telecoms security function.

There may also be instances in which the JCRA would seek to work with the NCSC, as the UK's technical JCRA for cybersecurity and as part of that, share certain information relating to telecoms security. The JCRA expects to disclose such information without prior reference to the Provider, although it will explain the likely extent and basis of such sharing when the JCRA requests the information. This will both ensure compliance with legal responsibilities and also benefit Islanders through creating opportunities to enhance telecoms security policy, helping identify new threats and vulnerabilities and remaining abreast of evolving threats and technologies.

6.6 The JCRA may also need to share information with other bodies on an occasional basis where appropriate, such as the Jersey Office of the Information Commissioner (**JOIC**), to enable them to perform their respective functions. In this case, the JCRA will follow the relevant specific guidance set out below.

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<sup>5</sup> The JSCS is presently part of the Government but expected to become an arm's length organisation created by statute. At this point, it is expected that its governing law will incorporate the statutory gateway allowing the Authority to continue sharing certain information.

- 6.7 The JCRA expects to share both general and specific information on telecoms security with others. General information relates to details about telecoms security that do not relate to any specific Provider or Providers, but which may help the JCRA and others enhance knowledge, expertise and capabilities relating to telecoms security. Specific information relates to details that may be associated with an individual Provider or Providers. Guidance set out below explains the approach the JCRA expects to take for this latter type of information sharing.

## Specific guidance on information sharing

### Information received through Information Request Notices

- 6.8 Except for some specific circumstances or unless specifically warranted, the JCRA expects to notify Providers at the point of formally requesting information of those parts of the information received that may be shared with others and explain the basis of such disclosure including specifying the relevant statutory gateway being used. Where appropriate, the JCRA may ask for a Provider's consent before sharing specific information with others.

### Information received through incident reporting

- 6.9 Providers have a duty under the Law to inform the JCRA of any significant risk or occurrence of a security compromise. The JCRA has various functions under the Law to inform others in these circumstances.
- 6.10 Under Article 24U(2), the JCRA must inform the Minister in certain circumstances of the risk or occurrence of a security compromise. In this case, the JCRA expects to disclose the relevant information without prior reference to the reporting Provider, although the JCRA will endeavour to notify them after making the disclosure.
- 6.11 Under Article 24U(3)(4), the JCRA may inform others of the risk or occurrence of a security compromise, including any person who uses or has used the affected network or service, any communications Provider, any person who makes associated facilities available, any overseas regulator, any relevant department of the UK government and the European Union Agency for Cyber Security. In this case, the JCRA will endeavour to inform the Provider before sharing any information, or where this is not possible, the JCRA will endeavour to notify the Provider after sharing the information.
- 6.12 There may also be a need for the JCRA to disclose information to third parties for the purposes of exercising their own functions in the interests of the security of Jersey. The JCRA expects this will include sharing information with the Minister, as the Government's

policy lead, the JCSC<sup>6</sup>, established by the Minister to be the Government's body responsible for promoting and improving the Island's cyber resilience, and other Crown Dependency regulators performing a similar telecoms security function. The JCRA expects to disclose such information without prior reference to the Provider, although it will explain the likely extent and basis of such sharing when the JCRA requests the information. To the extent that third parties request that the JCRA discloses information for the purposes of exercising their own functions, it will endeavour to write to Providers in advance of making such disclosure.

- 6.13 It may also be necessary for the JCRA to disclose information to the Minister to assist in the formulation of policy. In such cases, the JCRA will endeavour to write to Providers in advance of making any such disclosures.

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<sup>6</sup> The Government has established the JCSC as the national authority for cyber security with clear objectives to prepare for, protect against and respond to cyber incidents.